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Abstract 
Confucius was and still is one of the most eminent Chinese philosophers. Such is the 
importance of Confucius’s teachings; it had influenced all aspects of social life in Chinese 
societies. In the post-Enron, post-Worldcom, and post-Global Financial Crisis era there are 
raising doubts in the mantra of the so-called conventional wisdom about law and economic 
order. Whilst many recent publications offered solutions to those problems like advocating 
for more laws, rules or reforms in regulatory institutions to enhance the regulation of 
corporate governance. What Confucius advocated was a non-legal, social mode of regulation 
based on moral ideals that should be embedded into the minds of every person. Whilst this is 
an ancient concept from primitive societies, its relevance and merits could be seen in modern 
Chinese societies like Hong Kong. In essence, Confucian principles of governance build on 
relational and paternalistic order based on moral ideals. 
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Introduction 
China has just unveiled a statue of Confucius in Tiananmen Square on the 12th January 2011. 
This is one of the latest sign of the ancient philosopher's comeback after decades in which 
Mao Zedong suppressed his teachings.3 Even though Confucius’s revival in China is 
politically motivated, the Chinese Communist party’s aim is to champion a harmonious and 
stable society.4 But what exactly does Confucian doctrines espoused, and how does it apply to 
corporate governance? And why does Confucius advocates governance without laws? 
Besides, why is Confucius’s doctrines relevant for today’s global business environment for 
Chinese societies? These are some of the questions this paper would analyse and discuss. 
 
In order to appreciate Confucius’s teachings, one must first be aware that his doctrines can be 
quite strange for Westerners as the logic of Chinese values could be far removed from 
Western rationality. For example, Foucault, a French philosopher was bewildered by the 
logics and taxonomy in Chinese thinking when he attempted to make sense of passages in a 
Chinese encyclopaedia. He wrote the following in the preface of one his books, 
A ‘certain Chinese encyclopaedia’ in which it is written that ‘animals are divided into divided into: (a) 
belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray 
dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine 
camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off 
look like flies’.5 
And he remarked that, 
In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by 
means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the 
                                                     
3 ‘Confucius Comeback Continues with Tiananmen Status’, Channelnewsasia.com (online), 12 January 2011 
<http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/lifestylenews/view/1104210/1/.html>. 
4 Jeffrey Wasserstrom, China in the 21st Century: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, 
2010) 12. 
5 Michael Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (Vintage Books, 1994) xv. 
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limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that. But what is it impossible to think, 
and what kind of impossibility are we faced with here? Each of these strange categories can be 
assigned a precise meaning and a demonstrated content; some of them do certainly involve 
fantastic entities – fabulous animals or sirens – but, precisely because it puts them into categories of 
their own,…[emphasis added]6 
The above passages in Foucault’s book exemplify how certain aspects of Confucian doctrines 
could be difficult to decipher from Western perspectives. The order of things in traditional 
China as this example has shown could be perplexing. This does not mean Chinese society or 
philosophy is irrational, it is merely different.  
 
Pertaining to the Confucian value system and logic concerning regulation and governance, 
one has to begin by retracing and relating some his complex and interlinking ideas and ideals. 
This involves describing and explaining his work, then breaking it down and analysing those 
concepts in four sections. The first section would focus on Confucius’s attitude about law and 
regulation through jurisprudential debates, and the second about the governance of society 
and family, which is central to understanding how corporate governance in Chinese societies 
had evolved. The third section is a brief historical account of Chinese business enterprises 
and its governance up to the 20th century, followed by section four, a case study on Hong 
Kong to illustrate the influence of Confucian thinking has on the governance of Chinese 
companies, in particular family companies. 
 
For the sceptics who ponder about the use of a three thousand year old ancient concept, in the 
post-Enron, post-Worldcom, and post-Global Financial Crisis era there are raising doubts in 
the mantra of the so-called conventional wisdom about law and economic order. Whilst many 
                                                     
6 Michael Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (Vintage Books, 1994) xv. 
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recent publications offered solutions to those problems like advocating for more laws, rules 
or reforms in regulatory institutions to enhance the regulation of corporate governance, this 
paper offers a different view. Even though there merits in some of the contemporary 
regulatory and governance innovations, Confucius foresaw some of these present problems, 
the answer does not lie in making more rules or instituting more reforms to fix what he 
deemed as human failings. This not to say one should merely transplant Confucius’s 
teachings to regulate corporate governance, rather one should appreciate the merits of his 
ideas and ideals, which could be valuable additions to post-crisis solutions and conventional 
wisdom. 
 
A caveat to note is - Confucius's writings were not intended for corporate governance or 
business regulations per se. Much of Confucian thoughts and teachings focus on the 
governance of the state and family, as well as self-cultivation towards moral excellence. The 
concepts are overlapping and at times interchangeable, which could add to the confusion over 
Confucian doctrines,7 yet this in line with Chinese multi-layered dialectic rationality and 
integrative process of thinking.8 At the crux of Confucius thesis, he believed that human 
nature is good, so his regulatory and governance principles were aimed at restoring this moral 
goodness in every individual.9  
 
                                                     
7 Steven Greer and Tiong Piow Lim, ‘Confucianism: Natural Law Chinese Style?’ (1998) 11 Ratio Juris, 80, 88. 
8 Chung-ying Cheng, ‘Inquiring into the Primary Model: Yi-Jing and Chinese Ontological Hermeneutics’ in Bo 
Mou (ed) Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy (Ashgate, 2003) 33-59; Bryan van Norden, ‘Virtue 
Ethics and Confucianism’, in Bo Mou (ed) Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy (Ashgate 
Publishing, 2003) 99-121. 
9 Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China: Exemplified by 190 Ch’ing Dynasty Cases with 
Historical, Social and Juridical Commentaries (Harvard University Press, 1967) 20. 
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Another thing to note is that the terminologies and concepts used in Confucius’s texts are 
often interlinked with humanism, dialectic rationality, and heuristic logic,10 this is atypical of 
Chinese philosophy.11 The same character in Chinese could be applied across many different 
contexts; each could offer diverse meanings and interpretations. Furthermore, Chinse as a 
language is highly coded language with pseudo-historical anecdotes and customs not explicit 
for non-Chinese, as this language is best understood through shared values and customs, and 
in particular from Confucian doctrines. As Cao, a Chinese legal linguist wrote,  
The Chinese people, educated or educated, do not need to have studied Confucius formally as 
Confucianism is the grammar and the vocabulary, literally and metaphorically, of Chinese 
culture and language through which the Chinese live and communicate their life. Chinese culture 
and Confucian values are transmitted through living as a Chinese and being a Chinese. Culture 
and Confucian culture exists in different levels. Formal eduction [sic] is only one of many means of 
cultural transmission. This applies to both recent and future generations [emphasis added].12  
Therefore, Westerners would are not immersed in the Chinese culture or know the language 
could find reading this paper frustrating at times. Nevertheless, by focusing on the core ideas 
and principles, the logic would become more apparent as one ploughs on. 
 
Confucian Jurisprudence Laying the Foundation for a Harmonious Society 
The difference between the West and Chinese notion of law takes root at the most 
fundamental level. Cao argued that jurisprudence in the Western sense of the word hardly 
                                                     
10 Chung-ying Cheng, ‘Inquiring into the Primary Model: Yi-Jing and Chinese Ontological Hermeneutics’ in Bo 
Mou (ed) Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy (Ashgate Publishing, 2003) 33, 56-57; Robert 
Allinson, ‘Hegelian, Yi-Jing, and Buddhist Transformational Models of Comparative Philosophy’ in Bo Mou 
(ed) Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy (Ashgate, 2003) 60, 62-65. 
11 Chung-ying Cheng, ‘Inquiring into the Primary Model: Yi-Jing and Chinese Ontological Hermeneutics’ in Bo 
Mou (ed) Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy (Ashgate Publishing, 2003) 33, 34-35. 
12 Deborah Cao, Chinese Law: A Language Perspective (Ashgate Publishing, 2004) 3. 
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existed in China.13 Rather, one should think of Chinese jurisprudence in terms of the schools 
of thoughts or legal traditions as the source of legal doctrines in China.14 Chinese legal 
traditions were shaped by two major schools of thoughts – Confucianism15 and Legalism (fa 
chia). Since this article is primarily interested in Confucianism, any mention of legalism 
would be brief.  
 
To begin with, Confucius (551-479 B.C.) had a disdain for laws and codes.16 He believed that 
a nation led by laws was condemned because perpetrators could find ways to avoid 
punishments. Even if compliance was achieved, those acts are insincere and the law is 
powerless to transform the inner character of these individuals.17 He asserted that only morals 
could remedy wrongful attitudes and conduct.18 In addition, Confucius did not belief that 
having robust systems and sophisticated social structures would lead to justice and good 
governance because these are fallible mechanisms and instruments created by men. If the 
architect of these instruments were not morally righteous, the systems that they had created 
would be flawed or deficient, unable to provide natural justice (tienli) in the spiritual sense to 
masses.19 
 
                                                     
13 Deborah Cao, Chinese Law: A Language Perspective (Ashgate Publishing, 2004) 3. In terms of jurisprudence 
Cao mean by meant the inquiry into fundamental questions about the law, the nature of the law, and the 
legitimacy of the law. 
14 Chongko Choi, East Asian Jurisprudence (Seoul National University Press, 2009) 7-33. 
15 Note there some subtle differences between Confucius and Neo-Confucians, they are usually labelled under 
the banner of Confucianism. This thesis will only examine the text and teachings by Confucius and Mencius.  
16 John Head and Yanping Wang, Law Codes in Dynastic China: A Synopsis of Chinese Legal History in the 
Thirty Centuries from Zhou to Qing (Carolina Academic Press, 2005) 39.  
17 Randall Peerenboom, China’s Long March toward Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 28. 
18 Deborah Cao, Chinese Law: A Language Perspective (Ashgate, 2004) 23. 
19 Chongko Choi, East Asian Jurisprudence (Seoul National University Press, 2009) 16-19. 
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The central thesis of Confucius’s doctrine is for individuals to embrace moral principles to 
internalise a sense of righteousness (yi) and attaining virtue (de),20 as well as achieve social 
harmony through the practice of propriety (li).21 This reflected his belief that human nature is 
good, thus the role of li was to steer people towards a moral life. He advocated that the King 
and his ministers should lead by example through the cultivation of moral principles. In this 
scheme of things, law and punishment was considered as secondary instruments or as a last 
resort to maintain social order.22  
 
In contrast with Confucianism, the legalist (fa chia) school of thought was diametrically 
opposite to the above ideals. Fa chia emerged from the writings of Shang Yang (361-338 
B.C.) and Han Feizi (280-233 B.C.).23 They viewed altruistic ideals espoused from li was not 
pragmatic,24 as with the growth of population comes social change, thus li is no longer 
capable of regulating the behaviour of the masses.25 Unlike li, they argued that laws were 
superior because it was clear-cut and not easily changed.26 Confucius advocated the use of li 
as a means to achieve social harmony, whereas fa chia believed that only laws supported by a 
clear system of rewards and punishment should be used to achieve social order.27 The 
domination of fa chia as the official legal and political ideology was brief; it emerged during 
                                                     
20 For discussions on definition of virtue and the differences between Confucian and Aristotle see Bryan 
Norden, ‘Virtue Ethics and Confucianism’ in Bo Mou (ed) Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy 
(Ashgate Publishing, 2003) 99, 102-106. 
21 Geoffrey MacCormack, The Spirit of Traditional Chinese Law (University of Georgia Press, 1996) 6-11; 
Hyung Kim, Fundamental Legal Concepts of China and the West: A Comparative Study (Kennikat Press, 1981) 
8-15. For definition of li see subsequent paragraphs.  
22 Phillip Chen, Law and Justice: The Legal System in China 2400 B.C. to 1960 A.D. (Dunellen Publishing, 
1973) 27. 
23 Yougping Liu, Origins of Chinese Law: Penal and Administrative Law in its Early Development (Oxford 
University Press, 1998) 173-186. 
24 Patricia Blazey and Gisele Kapterian, ‘Traditional Chinese Law’ in Patricia Blazey and Kah-Wah Chan (ed) 
The Chinese Commercial Legal System (Thomson, 2008) 19, 32-34. 
25 Phillip Chen, Law and Justice: The Legal System in China 2400 B.C. to 1960 A.D. (Dunellen Publishing, 
1973) 33. 
26 Geoffrey MacCormack, The Spirit of Traditional Chinese Law (University of Georgia Press, 1996) 5-6. 
27 Patricia Blazey and Gisele Kapterian, ‘Traditional Chinese Law’ in Patricia Blazey and Kah-Wah Chan (ed) 
The Chinese Commercial Legal System (Thomson, 2008) 19, 32-34. 
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the reign of the Qin dynasty and demised rapidly when the dynasty was replaced by Han 
rule.28 However, many elements of the fa chia lingered on and were eventually fused with 
Confucianism from the Tang dynasty onwards.29  
 
The importance of li for Confucius should not be underscored. The word li has many 
meanings. In its narrowest sense, li refers to religious sacrament like paying respects to 
ancestors. Thus, it is often translated in English as ritual or rites.30 In a broader sense, li refers 
to a host of ceremonial obligations, in both secular as well as religious affairs. Li would vary 
according to context and hierarchical ranking in the family and society, in each setting there 
would be etiquettes that everyone must adhere to. In short, li dictated how one should behave. 
In effect, they were rules of behaviour or codes of conduct.31 Even though, contravention of li 
does not invoke penal punishment, it is dependent on the social indignation to be effective. 
The assumption is - a wrongdoer is ashamed when the community display offence by the 
contravention of li, this in turns would make the perpetrator feel remorseful for wrongful 
conduct.32 This person is expected to repent for their erroneous ways. Then comes the process 
of rehabilitation, this involved the restoration of one’s morality through education.33 
Education in the Confucian sense is about invoking moral values.  
 
                                                     
28 Geoffrey MacCormack, The Spirit of Traditional Chinese Law (University of Georgia Press, 1996) 4-5; John 
Head and Yanping Wang, Law Codes in Dynastic China: A Synopsis of Chinese Legal History in the Thirty 
Centuries from Zhou to Qing (Carolina Academic Press, 2005) 72-76. 
29 Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China: Exemplified by 190 Ch’ing Dynasty Cases with 
Historical, Social and Juridical Commentaries (Harvard University Press, 1967) 27-28. For more on the 
differences between li and fa chia, see John Head and Yanping Wang, Law Codes in Dynastic China: A 
Synopsis of Chinese Legal History in the Thirty Centuries from Zhou to Qing (Carolina Academic Press, 2005) 
48-49. 
30 Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China: Exemplified by 190 Ch’ing Dynasty Cases with 
Historical, Social and Juridical Commentaries (Harvard University Press, 1967) 19. 
31 Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China: Exemplified by 190 Ch’ing Dynasty Cases with 
Historical, Social and Juridical Commentaries (Harvard University Press, 1967) 19. 
32 Bryan Van Norden, ‘The Virtue of Righteousness in Mencius’ in Kwong-loi Sun and David Wong (eds.), 
Confucian Ethic: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community (2004) 152-3 
33 James Brady, Justice and Politics in People’s China: Legal Order or Continuing Revolution? (Academic 
Press, 1982) 37-39. 
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Confucius had always maintained that he did not create with the concept of li. He merely 
revived it, li he proclaimed that it originated from ancient sages to teach human beings about 
the ways of the heaven.34 He felt it was his duty to collate and interpret li handed down from 
antiquity during reign of King Yao, King Shun, and Duke of Zhou (2100-771 BC, about 
several generations before his time).35 The Duke of Zhou explained that li came from the 
notion of tienming (mandate from heaven).36 Heaven was understood as the creator and 
mother of all things.37 The ruler or King was called the “son of heaven” because it was 
believed that he was the most virtuous (de) and thus given divine right to rule.38 Moreover, 
the King was expected to rule in accordance with li as it was the will of heaven.39 Those who 
followed li was said to be in harmony with heaven.40 The concept of the mandate from 
heaven in Confucianism denotes a moral and social code bestowed by heaven and thus “man” 
must abide by this order of nature.41 Therefore, li as a concept and doctrine was akin to 
Western medieval natural law.42 However, the society as a whole plays the critical role of 
                                                     
34 Hyung Kim, Fundamental Legal Concepts of China and the West: A Comparative Study (Kennikat Press, 
1981) 29-33. Note tienming (Mandate of Heaven) and tienxing (Heavenly Virtue) are religious concepts 
Confucius used to explain the connections between moral rules from heaven bestowed upon humanity - See 
pages 25-60.  
35 Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China: Exemplified by 190 Ch’ing Dynasty Cases with 
Historical, Social and Juridical Commentaries (Harvard University Press, 1967) 19; John Head and Yanping 
Wang, Law Codes in Dynastic China: A Synopsis of Chinese Legal History in the Thirty Centuries from Zhou to 
Qing (Carolina Academic Press, 2005) 5-9, 24-29; Yougping Liu, Origins of Chinese Law: Penal and 
Administrative Law in its Early Development (Oxford University Press, 1998) 89. 
36 John Head and Yanping Wang, Law Codes in Dynastic China: A Synopsis of Chinese Legal History in the 
Thirty Centuries from Zhou to Qing (Carolina Academic Press, 2005) 28. Tienming is defined as decree from 
heaven which determines one’s life or the rise of fall of the political order, see Hyung Kim, Fundamental Legal 
Concepts of China and the West: A Comparative Study (Kennikat Press, 1981) 39. 
37 Hyung Kim, Fundamental Legal Concepts of China and the West: A Comparative Study (Kennikat Press, 
1981) 40. 
38 Hyung Kim, Fundamental Legal Concepts of China and the West: A Comparative Study (Kennikat Press, 
1981) 40. 
39 John Head and Yanping Wang, Law Codes in Dynastic China: A Synopsis of Chinese Legal History in the 
Thirty Centuries from Zhou to Qing (Carolina Academic Press, 2005) 28. 
40 John Head and Yanping Wang, Law Codes in Dynastic China: A Synopsis of Chinese Legal History in the 
Thirty Centuries from Zhou to Qing (Carolina Academic Press, 2005) 28-30; Hyung Kim, Fundamental Legal 
Concepts of China and the West: A Comparative Study (Kennikat Press, 1981) 53. 
41 Hyung Kim, Fundamental Legal Concepts of China and the West: A Comparative Study (Kennikat Press, 
1981) 34. 
42 Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China: Exemplified by 190 Ch’ing Dynasty Cases with 
Historical, Social and Juridical Commentaries (Harvard University Press, 1967) 20. Note that unlike Western 
notions of natural law, the Confucius’s moral rules are not subject to change. However, how they are applied 
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applying the principles of li in all aspects of social life, especially concerning the regulation 
of one’s conduct in his / her relations to others in social life.43 Kim remarked that for 
Confucius, 
Nature law becomes social norm in the form of moral rules by which to regulate one’s conduct in 
his relations to others in social life. Natural law as a social norm demands what is necessary and 
good in social life of man. By such moral rules enforced by social sanction, the order and 
harmony were established in social life. In Chinese tradition, natural law expressed as social 
norm can be seen in the body of ‘li’ or the moral rules of propriety. The “Li” (body of rules of 
propriety) is the expression of the concept of “Way of Heaven” and “Way of Man” in concrete 
form, and it is the formal rules for human conduct… [“Li”] includes the sense of obligation in its 
concept of law and the “Li” as social moral rules is enforced by this sense of obligation. And such 
sense of duty is not rooted in the command or arbitrary legislation but in the Heaven (in the 
sense of rational principle) as the indicator of one’s duty to others. In the rules of propriety (Li) as 
such, morality is the source and the purpose of the rules of regulation for human conduct and the sense 
of moral obligation is the binding force of the social norm in traditional China [emphasis added].44 
 
Thus, this code of propriety encompassed all aspects of human life, governing the 
organisation of the state, families and social relations. For centuries, Chinese rulers had 
adopted li to attain humane rule over his subjects.45 As noted li is rooted in moral rules, so 
what are the moral rules? The answer lies in the concept of ren and yi.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
could be adapted. See Geoffrey MacCormack, The Spirit of Traditional Chinese Law (University of Georgia 
Press, 1996) 12-13. 
43 Hyung Kim, Fundamental Legal Concepts of China and the West: A Comparative Study (Kennikat Press, 
1981) 53. 
44 Hyung Kim, Fundamental Legal Concepts of China and the West: A Comparative Study (Kennikat Press, 
1981) 53, 55. 
45 Chichung Huang, The Analects of Confucius: A Literal Translation with an Introduction and Notes (1997) 20. 
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Ren could be simply defined as benevolence,46 other descriptions of the Chinese character 
are; “altruism”, “humanity”, “love”, “kindness”, “perfect virtues”, “goodness”, and “human-
heartedness”.47 For Confucius, ren is the essence of perfecting one’s virtues or perfection of 
human character.48 Ren is the most important virtue and moral principle in Confucianism.49 
Chong claimed that, ‘Ren is absent when li is performed without proper spirit, and the rituals 
of li, seen in this light, have an education function in bringing about the attitudes and values 
incorporating ren.’50 In short, li is proper form and ren is substance of what constitute proper. 
Lai noted that,  
In cases where li-practices are no longer acceptable or detrimental to humanity, ren has the role 
of upholding a commitment to humanity. Ren is fundamental and therefore dubbed the higher 
order concept: ‘…ren as an inner morality is not caused by the mechanism of li from outside. It is 
higher-order concept which gives meaning to li’. In other words, ren provides the criteria for 
assessing li-practices [emphasis added].51 
 
Therefore, li-ren is central to Confucian morality and the foundation of the Confucian order.52 
In essence, a leader has to apply li in public governance. Yet li is not a rigid yardstick of 
moral conduct, rather it is moderated by the affection of ren to bring about social harmony in 
society.53  
 
                                                     
46 Yougping Liu, Origins of Chinese Law: Penal and Administrative Law in its Early Development (Oxford 
University Press, 1998) 91. 
47 Kim-chong Chong, Early Confucian Ethics (Open Court, 2007) 19. 
48 Philip Ivanhoe and Bryan van Norden, Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (2001) 359.  
49 Karyn Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 24-25. 
50 Kim-chong Chong, Early Confucian Ethics (Open Court, 2007) 19. 
51 Karyn Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 29. 
52 Yougping Liu, Origins of Chinese Law: Penal and Administrative Law in its Early Development (Oxford 
University Press, 1998) 91. 
53 Steven Greer and Tiong Piow Lim, ‘Confucianism: Natural Law Chinese Style?’ (1998) 11 Ratio Juris 80, 82. 
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The word yi means right, righteousness, proper or just.54 Yi is a moral quality that ensures li is 
not wrongly applied or followed blindly. Confucius felt the moral principle of yi is second 
only to ren.55 In the Analects Confucius linked the concepts of ren, yi and li together as if 
they were all interconnected limbs of moral wholeness.56 In sum, li is the way of heaven 
linking people and their spirituality to create a harmonic order on earth. 
 
Another important thing is to recognize, li creates social stratification, differentiation and 
hierarchical order in society.57 Confucius did not believe that people and are born equal, as a 
consequence society was characterised by relationship of ‘subordination and 
superordination’.58 The differentiation by social status and “rectification of names” (royal 
titles and ranks) constructed a hierarchical order in which people are discriminated in 
accordance to their status and roles.59 With status come different levels of responsibilities. 
Confucian morality expects those higher up in the hierarchy live by a higher moral standard 
and should set an example of moral excellence for those lower in the social pecking order.60 
Harmonic order is achieved when the responsibilities associated with the duties of each 
parties’ (for example ruler, father, son, brother, or friend) have been fulfilled.61 
 
                                                     
54 Kim-chong Chong, Early Confucian Ethics (Open Court, 2007) 9. 
55 Chichung Huang, The Analects of Confucius: A Literal Translation with an Introduction and Notes (Oxford 
University Press, 1997) 18. 
56 Chichung Huang, The Analects of Confucius: A Literal Translation with an Introduction and Notes (Oxford 
University Press, 1997) 19. 
57 John Head and Yanping Wang, Law Codes in Dynastic China: A Synopsis of Chinese Legal History in the 
Thirty Centuries from Zhou to Qing (Carolina Academic Press, 2005) 42-44. 
58 John Head and Yanping Wang, Law Codes in Dynastic China: A Synopsis of Chinese Legal History in the 
Thirty Centuries from Zhou to Qing (Carolina Academic Press, 2005) 42. 
59 Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China: Exemplified by 190 Ch’ing Dynasty Cases with 
Historical, Social and Juridical Commentaries (Harvard University Press, 1967) 33-34; WM T de Bary, Wing-
Tsit Chan, and Burton Watson, Sources of Chinese Tradition: Volume I (Columbia University Press, 1960) 18. 
60 Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China: Exemplified by 190 Ch’ing Dynasty Cases with 
Historical, Social and Juridical Commentaries (Harvard University Press, 1967) 35. 
61 Yu Kam Yan, The Influence of Confucianism on Chinese and Japanese Business Society (MA Thesis, 
University of Hong Kong, 2003) 17-18.  
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It is important to recall that Confucius had a disdain for the law. Albeit his teachings were 
adopted as a jurisprudential doctrine, the principles espoused was more than just a legal 
doctrine, they had clear regulatory effect. Confucius’s justifications for the application of li as 
a regulatory method were linked to the concept of tienli developed before Confucius’s time in 
antiquity during the reign of sagely Kings (Yao, Shu and Yu).62 Tien refers to heaven, often 
employed to denote the natural powers that governed all creatures in the universe.63 
Therefore, tienli is moral rules of conduct mandated by heaven.64   
 
Moral principles as source of regulatory standards could be justified as doctrines emanating 
from natural law, but for Confucius he believed that morality tied to humanity, and a kind of 
higher truth that is innate in part of human nature.65 However, unlike the Christian traditions, 
Confucius did not subscribe to the notion men are born with equal rights.66 In addition, unlike 
the Christian traditions where Aquinas proclaimed that the law of man is connected the law 
of God,67 Confucius’s take on Chinese antiquity heaven is rooted in humanity,68 and that 
                                                     
62 WM T de Bary, Wing-Tsit Chan, and Burton Watson, Sources of Chinese Tradition: Volume I (Columbia 
University Press, 1960) 1. 
63 WM T de Bary, Wing-Tsit Chan, and Burton Watson, Sources of Chinese Tradition: Volume I (Columbia 
University Press, 1960) 3. 
64 Hyung Kim, Fundamental Legal Concepts of China and the West: A Comparative Study (Kennikat Press, 
1981) 29-37. 
65 Brian Bix, ‘Natural Law: The Modern Tradition’ in Jules Coleman and Scott Shaprio (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press, 2004) 61, 65; WM T de Bary, 
Wing-Tsit Chan, and Burton Watson, Sources of Chinese Tradition: Volume I (Columbia University Press, 
1960) 88-89. 
66 Raymond Dawson, The Chinese Experience (Phoenix Press, 1978) 86. 
67 Marett Leiboff and Mark Thomas, Legal Theories in Principle (Thomson, 2004) 57. 
68 WM T de Bary, Wing-Tsit Chan, and Burton Watson, Sources of Chinese Tradition: Volume I (Columbia 
University Press, 1960) 88-89. 
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human are born good (this is distinct from the Christian believe in “original sin”.69 Thus, the 
regulatory function of li is to ensure humanity preserve this goodness.70  
 
 
Interestingly, Confucius also understood “men” to be social beings,71 so we live in close 
contact with our fellow “men”.72  What we knows is thus from what we learn initially from 
our parents and then from our fellow “men”.73 Since our lives are essentially social, we would 
come to know the ways of the heaven from our parents and fellow “men”.74 Therefore, moral 
principles should be imparted to us from our family and through socialisation. In effect, 
Confucius operationalised li not in the form of legal instruments, but through social norms 
based on moral values.  
 
Li was essentially an unwritten code of conduct to promote a cohesive society through social 
stratification and humane principles to create harmony.75 For Confucius creating a 
harmonious society order is one of his greatest ideal. The highest order of this harmonious 
society was what he called da tong (Grand Unity).76  
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Unlike laws or legal codes, li was a principle based social code with regulatory effect because 
it is a form of normative social ordering. Yet conformance was not achieved by commands 
from the Emperor or state, rather it was coerced by way of social expectations and 
indoctrinated from childhood in the family.77 Confucius believed that li had to be internalised 
on an individual level, practised in every household, and reciprocated at the wider social 
level. Even though, the contravention of li did not constitute breaching the law so no official 
punishment would be imposed by the courts, acting contrary to li would attract censure by 
way of public shaming and social indignation, which had a penal effect. It was expected that 
the wrongdoer or perpetrator would feel ashamed by social denunciation and in turns 
becomes remorseful.78 Remorse according to Confucius becomes a catalyst to alter the 
behaviour of the wrongdoer and rehabilitate them by appealing to their own social conscience 
and sense of righteousness.79 Rehabilitation is an important component of li as a regulatory 
system, unlike laws where penalty or punishment is the consequence for breaching the legal 
codes, for Confucius li has an educative function.80  De Bary, Chan, and Watson noted that 
Confucius pointed out his believed that all men were born with an inclination towards 
goodness; it is only neglect and abuse of this innate goodness, which leads them into evil 
ways.81 Therefore, the regulatory function of li was to ensure humanitarian principles were 
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upheld.82 And with rehabilitation achieved through the restoration of human goodness, as 
such harmony between human and heaven would be realised.83 
 
Nevertheless, li as a regulatory concept was not without flaws. The hierarchical order in 
society gave those with royal titles and vast riches many privileges, special treatment and 
leniency if they breached li.84 The temptation to abuse their powers were noted in the 
teachings of Confucius.85 Li also helped those in power maintain control over the populous 
and suppressed any form of opposition, which could explain why Confucius placed much 
emphasis on moral principles as the foundation of this concept.86 Another weakness in this 
Confucian regulatory concept is that the principles are broad without detailed prescription. In 
addition, the application of li varied according to context and status, interpretation was 
subjective and ad hoc. This meant that the application of li lacked the uniformity found in 
legal codes. Furthermore, li as an instrument of social control was found to serve political 
ends rather than moral purpose, from the late Han dynasty onwards (25 BC) there was a 
gradual codification of Confucianism (also known as “Confucianisation of the law”).87 This 
had altered the spirit of li when it was codified, from maintenance of a natural harmonious 
order to strengthening of the Emperor’s control over his subjects,88 because codification 
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incorporated many Legalist elements into the Confucianisation of law.89 This over the 
centuries had reduced Confucius’s teachings into mere form and empty symbolism 
undermining the true spirit of li.90   
 
To recap, li is rules of proper behavior. Li would vary according to context, hierarchy in the 
family or society. It determined the rituals and rites performed as well as proper etiquette is 
practiced during human interactions and intercourse. Even though the doctrine of li appeared 
to be a top down system of regulatory order, it is not because it did not originate from the 
state per se. In spite of references to heaven and heavenly ways liken natural laws, yet the 
concept is not from biblical text like the “ten commandments”. Li as a regulatory concept is 
based on moral principles, enforced at home and in society to achieve harmonious social 
order. As a regulatory instrument, it is not prescriptive like legal codes and rules, this 
principle based regulatory tool gives it flexibility and versatility. More important, li as a 
regulatory principle withstood the test of time, this is extraordinary by current modern 
standards. Then again, this all-embracing regulatory principle and instrument could give rise 
to potential inconsistency in the criterion of what constitute li, as the interpretation and 
application of this regulatory principle could vary in each family and community. This could 
mean the line between li as a unified regulatory principle, ancestral and regional customs 
becomes muddled. Furthermore, the interpretation of li within a community or household 
could create new arbitrary regulatory norm as there are no established process or procedure to 
vet the validity and reasonableness in the interpretation li, except theological references to 
heaven. This suggests that li as a regulatory principle could be exploited by the powerful for 
their own ends. Perhaps, this is why for the centuries Chinese Emperors been able to abuse li 
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as a personalised form of arbitrary control over his subjects. So the use of li for legitimate and 
humane purpose rest upon those in power to align their decisions and action with the moral 
ideals (see below for details) stipulated in Confucius’s teachings.  
 
The importance of li as a regulatory principle and instrument in ancient China is second to 
none, laws (fa) or imperial legal codes in China were considered less important. Even 
magistrates’ were not legally qualified; instead, they were examined on their knowledge of 
Confucius’s teachings,91 as Alford noted that, 
The Confucian classic were the embodiment of Chinese morality and deep responsibilities that those in 
positions of authority had to their in their charge. What better preparation could there be for a 
potential father-mother official [magistrate or fumu guan], charged with a panoramic range of 
legal, administrative, and fiscal responsibilities, than a through appreciation of the moral 
message of Confucianism? Procedural details for conducting trials and the like could be spelled 
out in rule books that the magistrate could consult as necessary – or, better yet, have one of his 
many underlings consult for him [emphasis added].92 
In contrast, in the last few centuries the West adopted legal centralism, where the conception 
of regulation is law centred with prescriptive rules, unified by hierarchical ordering of 
normative propositions by the state.93 This meant the enacting more legal rules to tackle a 
range of social and economic woes of modernity. This was not the case for ancient China. 
 
Moreover, this regulatory principle (based on ren and yi) was effective in terms of securing 
widespread voluntary compliance because it was widely accepted by society as a norm. 
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Unlike in the West, the role of the state is central to law and order, in ancient China the 
natural order of things. Harmony is the product of this natural order. Li was the source of this 
harmonious order. It governed all aspect of social life in ancient China. A key factor for its 
success this regulatory principle and instrument (as noted in the above), was largely due to 
the indoctrination of li from birth, taught by father to son. Li was so important, it became part 
of one’s culture and identity deeply entrenched in the minds of every Chinese since early 
childhood. Therefore, the family role was vital to dissemination and enforcement of this 
regulatory doctrine. 
 
Confucian Hierarchical Order and Family-centred Governance Principles 
For Confucius, the building blocks of a morally harmonious society come from the regulation 
of the family.94 He deemed a well-regulated and governed household is a microcosm of a 
well-governed state.95 Confucius said, in order for the King to rule the state well, it is 
necessary to regulate the family first.96 Even magistrates, who were delegated the task of 
acting on behalf of the King / Emperor within his district or province, were popular known as 
the Fumu Guan  (Father-mother official) – which meant when solving disputes between 
subjects, they should act with parental care over the litigants’ grievances.97 Legality and legal 
standards in Chinese courts were often peripheral; Alford noted that, ‘magistrates did not 
receive formal training in law or finance, but were instead expected to have masters the 
Confucian classics.’98 
 
                                                     
94 James Legge, Confucius: Confucian Analects, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean (Dover 
Publications, 1971) 357. 
95 James Legge, Confucius: Confucian Analects, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean (Dover 
Publications, 1971) 358. 
96 James Legge, Confucius: Confucian Analects, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean (Dover 
Publications, 1971) 370. 
97 William Alford, ‘On the Limits of “Grand Theory” in Comparative Law’ ( 1986) 61, Washington Law 
Review, 945, 952. 
98 William Alford, ‘On the Limits of “Grand Theory” in Comparative Law’ ( 1986) 61, Washington Law 
Review, 945, 952. 
20 
 
The logic of Confucius’s thinking according to de Bary, Chan and Watson, ‘One can never 
teach outsiders if one cannot teach one’s own family.’99 The ruler is therefore a model son, a 
good father, and a dependable brother.100 That is why, ‘Only when one’s behaviour as father, 
as son and as elder or younger brother is worthy of emulation will people take one as a moral 
exemplar. This is what meant by the statement: ‘the establishment of orderly rule in one’s 
kingdom is predicated upon putting one’s family into proper balance.’’101  
  
The ethos of the regulation of the family is found in the concepts of five key relationships 
(wu lun) and three bonds (sangang). It is the foundation of an orderly and civil society.102 
Confucius believed each person in society has multiple roles relative to who they are and 
these five relationships are universal relational obligations.103 The five relationships are those 
between: 1) father and son; 2) ruler and subject; 3) husband and wife; 4) elder and younger 
siblings; and 5) between friends.104 These five relationships prescribed behavioural standards 
based on a differentiated hierarchical order.105  This meant that the Chinese society are neither 
individual-based nor society-based, they are relation-based, where the focus is not on any 
individual, but on the nature of the relations, each having a set of reciprocal but differentiated 
obligations.106 Thus, wu lun hypothesised a seamless code of behaviour with the ideal ruler 
being benevolent, the ideal subordinate being loyal; the ideal father is compassionate, the 
ideal son is filial; the ideal older sibling is thoughtful, the ideal younger brother is respectful; 
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the ideal husband is righteous, the ideal wife is compliant; the ideal friends is truthful.107  
Therefore, the moral obligations between each person in the relationship are clear 
differentiated. Confucius believed that having clearly defined roles and obligations would 
also bring about harmonious orderly in society, as wu lun was a sub set of the natural order of 
things prescribed by li.108  
 
Out of the five relationships, three bonds (sangang) - ruler and subject, father and son, 
husband and wife - were singled out as possessing great significance for the family and the 
society.109 Chen noted that, ‘on the positive side, it may also be said that the ‘three bonds’ 
made a major contribution to Chinese civilisation by ensuring the maintenance of  relatively 
stable social and political order most of the time during the two millennia.’110 The ultimate 
goal of sangang is to create social harmony and harmonious relationships.111 Loyalty and 
duty governs the relationship between ruler and subject, affection between father and son, 
and honour between husband and wife.112 What is also clear from five relationships and three 
bonds is Confucius’s focus on the family as the basic unit of society and civilisation. It is also 
a, ‘mechanism of symbolic control for the primary purpose of social stability.’113  
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The first two bonds gave rise to cardinal duties and duties of zhong (loyalty) and xiao (filial 
piety).114 Such are their importance without zhong and xiao, Confucius believed there would 
be social unrest and chaos. Zhong is an upmost duty subjects and ministers owe to their 
ruler.115 Yet loyalty does not mean unquestionable obedience.116 A minister must offer advice 
the ruler respectfully and stands firm on what is righteous.117 The relationship between the 
ruler and his subject is thus not immutable. If the ruler acted immorally, his subjects are not 
obliged to be loyal.118 For Confucius loyal also embodies the ability of the ruler to be 
introspective and self critical.119 The ruler must be able to relate to his subject and understand 
their concerns. He must be benevolent and morally righteous in order to command loyalty 
from his subjects.120 Conceptually, loyalty is closely linked to filial piety. Both loyalty and 
filial piety shared a common thread; the relationships are vertical and inflexible (subjects 
have to be loyal to their ruler, son has be filial towards his father), and moral values 
unpinning the hierarchical order.121 More important, according to Confucius a person who is 
xiao is inclined to be respectful and unlikely to defy his superiors or seniors, so this person is 
also said to be zhong to his seniors and ruler.122 Therefore, by this logic a xiao person is a 
zhong subject. 
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For Confucius the family is, ‘the primary locus within which one’s first relationship is 
formed.’123 The notion of xiao (filial piety) is the most important moral duty of all. Xiao is not 
only the bedrock of a hierarchical order in a family, it is the key measure of moral excellence 
of a person.124 Whilst the mandate to ruler is conferred by heaven, a ruler could in theory be 
replaced by the next in line if he was guilty of not performing filial duties towards his 
mother.125 Xiao is not merely blind obedience of a child towards his or her parents, nor is it 
providing for them financially when parents become old and frail. It embodies respect, love, 
and reverence one feels for one’s parents in one’s heart, not only while they are alive but also 
after their passing.126  
 
Xiao lies at the heart of Confucianism. Chen went further by noting passages in historical 
text, ‘As it is said in the “Chronicle of Literature and Art,” contained in the History of the 
Han Dynasty: “Filial Piety” [xiao] is the rule of Heaven, the (sense of) righteousness of Earth 
and the (basis of the) people’s conduct.’127 Clearly, xiao is the cornerstone of Chinese family 
life and the foundation of social and political order in China.128 According to Choi, ‘The 
reason why filial piety [xiao] was so critical to Confucian monarchy was that it formed the 
vital link between the Confucian system of family ethics and the question of loyalty to the 
state.’129  
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It is equally important to note the imperial governments endorsed xiao by imposing stringent 
sanctions on unfilial children, at the extreme, death penalty could be imposed by the 
magistrate.130 Xiao also meant that imperial legal codes recognised the authority of the 
grandfather or father over all the members of the family and all matters in the household.131 
Xiao had such an impact in Chinese society that Ch’u noted, ‘The law was the chief 
instrument through which the parental will was recognized and implemented.’132 However, 
nowhere in Confucius’s writings did he want xiao to become legalised in any form or 
manner. For Confucius xiao was second to human nature. 
 
Even though the concept of xiao originated over three thousand years ago, it is still relevant 
in Hong Kong and other Chinese societies today. For example, Lee who examined whether 
traditional values still exist in modern Chinese societies like China and Singapore. Survey 
results in China ranked xiao (filial piety) fourth place after loyalty and devotion to state.133 In 
comparison, Singaporean ranked xiao first place.134 The author found Singaporeans remained 
deeply influenced by Confucianism.135 He also found Singaporeans were like Hong Kong 
Chinese residents when it came to preserving basic tenets of individual moral conduct and 
interpersonal relations from Confucian doctrines. Furthermore, there values were fostered 
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from within the family in their upbringing.136 Despite influences from the West, both 
Singaporeans and Hong Kong Chinese remained rooted in Chinese cultural values especially 
when it comes to xiao.137 In another study, Zhang and Bond who are psychologists found that 
there was no gender or regional differences between Hong Kong Chinese and Mainland 
Chinese in the endorsement of xiao as a norm.138 Furthermore, respondents who strongly 
subscribed to xiao tended to also rated harmony and good relations highly.139 In a recent 
article by Ho et al on the cultural dimensions of directors’ duties in China, they surveyed a 
number of people in Hong Kong as comparative data on this subject matter and found that,  
The most important value was “filial piety”. This is arguably the most traditional value that stems 
from Confucian ethics, dating back appropriately 3,000 years. Other highly regarded values were 
“self-cultivation”, “respecting relationships by status”, “benevolent authority” and “having a 
sense of shame”. The results of the four vignettes also reinforce the influence of traditional Chinese 
mindsets… [S]o far the preliminary results of the survey support the authors' hypothesis that Chinese 
traditional values do matter in Chinese directors' mindsets [emphasis added].’140 
Hamilton added that, 
Chinese entrepreneurs [in Hong Kong and Taiwan] use the principle of xiao (best conceptualized in 
this context as “obedience to patriarchy”) to organize the inner (nei) realm of their business. Using the 
principles embodied in xiao, Chinese entrepreneurs want to manage and control their own 
businesses and the long-term fate of those businesses on an authoritative basis that is apart from 
the demands of both family members and business colleagues. If businesses grow large, 
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entrepreneurs often elect to subdivide their firms, through starting independent firms that re-
concentrate the enterpreneur’s authority and create a new profit center [emphasis added].141 
 
Therefore, xiao (filial piety) had perpetuated the continuation of paternalistic governance in 
Chinese societies like Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore.  
 
However, this does mean it is lopsided relationship. In principle, there are reciprocal moral 
obligations placed upon the father. As a father, he is the leader of his household, according to 
Confucius the regulation of the family depends on the cultivation of individual morals. 
Chapter 8 of The Great Learning stated that, ‘the regulation of one’s family depends on the 
cultivation of his person…[i]f the person be not cultivated, a man cannot regulate his 
family.’142 For Confucius, ‘self cultivation focuses on training oneself to follow the li (rituals) 
of the social value system conforming orderly to the social norms.’143  
 
This high moral expectation also applied to the ruler of the state. In chapter ten of The Great 
Learning, Confucius said to make the kingdom peaceful, the King should lead by example so 
his subjects will learn to be virtuous and act ethically,144 and the principle of reciprocity is the 
yardstick by which he regulates himself.145 A good ruler has to first attend to his own moral 
cultivation because by being virtuous he will gain the support of his subjects. His subjects 
will help the ruler obtain territory not through military conquest because people from other 
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kingdoms will bring their possessions to join his kingdom, and having territory will bring the 
king tax revenue and wealth. The King should thus use the resources wisely for the 
betterment of his subjects.146 Chen wrote, 
Since all laws and orders in a monarchy emanate from the rules of a country, it goes without saying 
that the ruler must possess surpassing wisdom and courage; more, he must be a man of exemplary 
virtue so that he can merit the respect and confidence of the whole nation…[S]ince the sovereign is 
the symbol of virtue, he must adjust and purity himself as if he were fasting. He must regulate his 
dress carefully to show his dignity and respect. He must not make any more contrary to the rules 
of propriety [emphasis added].147 
 
In sum, the Confucian virtuous society is mapped out under a hierarchical order of three core 
relationships stipulated in sangang. Ultimately, moral values were aimed at creating social 
order and harmony. Chen explained the link between moral cultivation and harmony in the 
following, 
Confucius preached the priority of internal moral self-cultivation as the aim and duty of being 
human. Generally speaking, they were optimistic about human nature, believing that moral goodness 
is inherent in each human being,… [T]hus, internal cultivation, having an orderly family, 
participating in government of the state, and finally bringing peace and enlightenment to the 
world, are seen as successive stages in the unfolding of the possibilities of a life that is truly and fully 
lived. The whole process may also be seen as ‘a continuous harmonious movement from the 
innermost harmony to the outermost harmony,’…[emphasis added].148  
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Confucius linked order and morals like “yin and yang” which produces a cosmic harmony, 
because hierarchical order offers social stability and morals is the substance of human nature, 
when combined they provide ‘oneness of humanity and nature, and the union of human and 
the heavenly.’149  
 
Leadership (as a King or father) according to Confucius should be ground upon morality.150 
Accordingly, those who lead must be strive towards moral excellence.151 Wah noted that,  
If an organization’s leader does not act with morality, then the whole organization will not gain 
the confidence and trust of its people or its business counterparts. To gain the trust of the people, 
the Confucian leader has to be trustworthy – that is, dependable and honourable…[L]eadership is 
built on a foundation of moral character and exercised through virtuous example. The Confucian 
leader gains the support and confidence of his followers through virtue and not violence. He prefers to 
“rule by virtue” rather than “rule of laws.” [emphasis added]152 
Striving towards moral excellent according to Confucius begins from the cultivation of the 
five constant virtues (wu chang de).153 The five constants are ren (benevolence), yi 
(righteousness), li (propriety), zhi (wisdom), and xin (good faith).154 The first three of these 
five constants virtues were found in the discussions above about Confucian jurisprudence and 
governance, the fourth, zhi (wisdom) comes from refers to knowledge derive from reflective 
learning and introspection.155 So for a leader zhi (wisdom) is a virtue because he / she needs to 
know their own faults in order to rectify them, and the ability to take precaution against 
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repeating the same faults.156 Zhi (wisdom) is also a virtue that enables a leader to make good 
judgements and the foresight to be aware of consequences of each decision.157 Xin (good 
faith) is a virtue flowing from honesty, integrity, and sincerity. Only with these attributes, a 
leader could earn the trust of the masses.158 Xin (good faith) is an integral component in 
Confucian notion of self-cultivation that he described it as the pin of a yoke that enables a 
carriage be drawn.159 These five constant virtues formed the basics of the cultivation of 
morals. Such was its importance the wu chang de (five constant virtues), they were portrayed 
as vital organs of the body.160 They work hand in hand, each virtue complements the other, 
out the five the single most important virtue is ren,161 Kim remarked that, 
The concept of Mandate of Heaven is understood not so much in the sense of the will of God or the 
purposeful force in the universe as in the sense of the rational and moral law or principle of Heaven 
revealed in the human nature itself (Hsing-Ming). For such concept of Hsing-Ming, the mandate of 
Heaven is understood as moral norm and applied to the ever-widening human relationships under 
various circumstances. In this way, Heaven is transformed into Jen [ren] in Confucianism. This is to 
say that the transcendental Heaven was transformed into the immanent moral principle of humanity 
[ren]. One can say that the mandate of Heaven became the mandate of humanity [ren].162 
 
For those who cultivate these virtues, Confucius had equates these individuals as “superior” 
or “noble” man (junzi), held in so high esteem, Confucius contrast the ways of a junzi with 
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those of the unworthy and scum (xiaoren).163 Junzi is not a person born in noble families, or 
those who have royal titles. Chen noted that, ‘The superior man [junzi], being careful in 
speech and action, takes filial piety, fraternal love, loyalty and faithfulness as the foundations 
of his conduct.’164 
 
These wu chang de (five constant virtues) are like moral benchmarks each person must strive 
towards in order to become junzi. Furthermore, theses five virtues have to be internalised 
through self-cultivation. Self-cultivation implied self-reflective understanding of the self with 
reference to those moral benchmarks.165 If after self-reflection and self-examination the junzi 
found his /her faults, he / she should censure him / her, and then rectify them, as well as guard 
against future mistakes.166 In linking morality and self-cultivation with the Confucian natural 
order of things, de Bary, Chan, and Watson remarked that,  
Human virtue does not exist or act in a sphere all its own, the “ethical” sphere, which is distinct from 
the metaphysical. The moral order and the cosmic order are one, and through ethical cultivation 
the individual not only achieves human perfection but also “realizes” himself in a mystic unity 
with Heaven and earth. In this way sincerity, as an active and dynamic force, works for the 
realization not only of man but also of all things [emphasis added].167 
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Yet this is not to say Confucian moral leadership is not pragmatic.168 Confucius, in the book, 
The Analects provided countless examples of applying moral judgement in a variety of 
context. Lai remarked that, ‘The contemporary reader of the Analects may reflect on a range 
of skills as they played out in its different passages. The passages provide a sense of the 
complexity and immediacy of different moral dilemmas. Each situation presents issues with 
different moral weights and completing obligations to be fulfilled.’169 Whilst Confucius made 
a case for leadership based on morals, reconciling between external form and interior 
intentions could only be achieved through a lifetime of refinements and learning.170 The 
cultivation of these morals and striving towards moral excellence is in fact using these moral 
principles as benchmarks to become a junzi.171 That is true leadership. As Fernandez noted 
that, 
The Confucian leader is expected to have great aspirations, achieve great self-control, and be a 
model to others to follow. In this sense, leadership is an end in itself – not a means to obtain what we 
want from others…[C]onfucius sculpted a model of leadership that was the zenith of human 
relations – the perfect person in society, a person who is not divorced from daily activities, a 
leader who is both idealistic and realistic. For this leader, carrying on his task is the very essence of 
the development of the perfection of his responsibility. Through her actions, the leader improves the 
world and brings harmony to all [emphasis added].172 
 
To sum up, the sangang (three bonds) and wu chang de (five constant virtues) are 
embodiment of the ways of heaven and established the ideal moral standards for all to 
cultivate in ancient China. Zhong (loyal) and xiao (filial piety) are two relational obligations 
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that represented sangang and wu chang.173 In another words junzi (noble man) have to 
internalise wu chang de, as well as apply these virtues indiscriminately towards others. For 
those who practice wu chang de, they are unconsciously xiao (filial piety) child, and zhong 
(loyal) subjects because only those who practice wu change de would of on their own accord 
be xiao, as this is an expression of a child’s gratitude towards his / her parent for the years of 
love and care. Xiao person is not would defy his superior or seniors and thus would be loyal 
to the ruler.174 For leaders, self-cultivation of wu chang de is essential. For Confucius, 
sangang wu chang are the foundations of a civilised society in accordance with the ways of 
heaven.  
 
Moreover, the values and ideals espouse from sangang wu chang are also in practice 
governance principles. They create a hierarchical social order based on moral principles. For 
Confucius public governance is modelled upon family governance. In every family the son 
has to be xiao towards his father, in turn the father has to be benevolent to his son and act in 
accordance with the principles of wu chang. Wu chang is learnt through self-cultivation. In 
effective, complying with wu chang de is a self-policing exercise, with the use self-reflection 
and introspection to regulate and govern one’s thoughts and behaviour. In addition, it is 
equally important to note that the Confucian principles of governance is not rule based, it is 
relational centred and paternalistic. Relational because Confucian teachings focus on 
humaneness and reciprocity where consensus between parties based on moral ideals is 
central, paternalistic as it maintains order via a chain of command underscored by 
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assumptions of paternal care for the welfare of others, altogether forms the vision of a 
harmonious social order. 
 
There are however weaknesses in Confucian principles in governance. Whilst putting into 
practice the concept of sangang is more straightforward with social stratification and the 
creation of hierarchical structures, wu chang de are ideal moral principles, could be highly 
subjective, ad hoc, and interpretative, dependent on the context which it is applied. As a 
regulatory or governance principle, standards and benchmarks would be difficult to establish. 
Unless society as a collective determine or set ground rules as to what constitute moral 
standards, the actualisation of wu chang de would remain a question of individual conscience. 
Conversely, codified rules could be circumvented or manipulated, which defeat the purpose 
of having legal rules. Sangang wu chang as principles of governance works on both 
individual and social levels. For individuals, this self-policing exercise is aimed at appealing 
to one’s conscience to strive towards voluntary compliance of the moral ideals, at a social 
level, the socialisation of moral ideals embed these moral ideals into a social norm. The 
interaction at both levels reinforces the moral principles espoused by Confucius.   
 
Translating all the above into the context of corporate governance in Chinese family 
companies, even though as Chinese societies modernise references to “heaven” and moral 
ideals might have eroded overtime, paternalistic governance in Chinese societies persevere. 
Westwood noted that,  
OSC [Overseas Chinese, which included Hong Kong] paternalistic headship is constituted through a 
distinctive admixture of clearly delineated and legitimized patriarchal authority, together with a 
reciprocal obligation for paternal benevolence and ‘virtuocracy’. This formation is embedded in 
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the cultural values and structures of the OSC, grounded particularly in the centrality of the family 
unit, the values and structures of which form a paradigmatic model for other societal structures 
and relationships [emphasis added].175 
Such is the entrenchment of such values and social norms, it perpetuated the Confucian 
principles of governance for centuries, which could help explain why China never needed to 
codify legal rules to regulate business enterprises.176 However, laws regulating companies did 
appear at under a shroud of cynicism by the imperial government at the turn of the 20th 
century. This break from tradition was due in part to pressure from the West in the final years 
of a crumbling imperial government in China.177 
 
What History Can Tell Us about Confucian influences in Chinese Business Enterprises? 
The first company law in China was enacted in 1904 just years before fall of the Qing 
Dynasty.178 The Act was enacted in hast and were transplanted from the European civil 
codes.179 China enacted company law primarily due to pressure from Western trading 
partners.180 For centuries, the underlying reason for successive imperial governments’ 
reluctance to legislate on companies was because Confucian doctrines did provide adequate 
governance guidance,181 which could explained the low number of Chinese companies 
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registered under this legislation.182  
 
The West criticism of Chinese cronyism and lack of will to modernise dated back to the Qing 
dynasty.183 For example, Weber (a renowned sociologist and lawyer) was critical of China’s 
unwillingness to modernise and adopt reform measures like those in the West. He argued 
China remained “imprison” in a cultural time warp until colonialism.184 Drawing from 
Chinese history, Weber made a number of assertions why China was backward. Hamilton 
wrote, 
In Weber’s view, China and the modern West differed in all the major institutional spheres: in 
the economy, in social structure, in political organization, and in religious institutions. Some 
differences were relatively small (e.g., urban division of labor, Weber 1951: 96-7), some were larger 
and more significant (e.g. divided European vs. united Chinese rule, 1951: 33-62), but on balance all of 
them could be read as showing that, although in antiquity the West and China were similar in most 
regards, the West had since altered greatly in ways that China had not. The explanation for Western 
trends consists of two parts. First, claimed Weber, in the West the structure of domination had 
changed from its patriarchal foundation, what Weber typo-logically termed “traditional 
domination”, to a foundation based upon laws and formal modes of reasoning. But in China the 
patriarchal grip was unbroken. Second, in asking how it was that the underlying logic of 
domination in the West had altered, Weber found that Western heterodox movements, and 
sectarian ways of life, had repeatedly challenged the supremacy of institutions based upon 
orthodox principles, principles that kings and popes had used to justify their practices since 
antiquity. In China, heterodox movements never offered Confucian orthodoxy much of a test, 
because Confucianism was so much oriented to conduct in this world and so little directed to 
otherworldly matters. But in the West, believed Weber (1951: 237), “The great achievement of ethical 
religions, above all of the ethical and asceticist sects of Protestantism, was to shatter the fetters of the 
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sib.” Emerging from patriarchalism, the West formed new logics and new justifications for institutions. 
These institutional innovations, as it turned out, were necessary preconditions of capitalism. But China 
remained patriarchal and so without the conditions that might have been conducive to an 
independent origin to capitalism [emphasis added].185 
Furthermore, Weber even suggested that the Chinese were incapable of logical thinking 
because of the nature of their language.186  
 
Setting aside the over simplistic analysis of Chinese traditions and economic developments, 
Weber’s arguments illustrated the divide between China and the West not only from 
historical perspective, but also its deep-seated value differences. So much so, that Weber 
misconstrue China’s civilisation as backward. Even Foucault in the preface of his book – The 
Order of Things, quoted in the above, was puzzled and bewildered by the taxonomy of 
animals in a Chinese encyclopaedia. Just because Chinese value system and way of thinking 
is different from the West, it does not mean China did not have a sophisticated system of 
governance and well developed markets.  
 
The size of the Chinese economy during the imperial rule of the Ming and Qing dynasty was 
arguably one of the largest domestic economies in the world during its time.187 Yet the 
imperial governments had never played a significant role in China’s commerce.188 The 
imperial official’s core duties concerning commerce were mainly confined to collecting 
taxes.189 Richardson noted that in Qing dynasty, 
The distinctive Confucian political economy which was designed to perpetuate an expanding agrarian 
empire remained intact. The aim continued to be to return to the ‘golden ages’ of the Song or Ming 
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[dynasty] rather than look beyond them. China had seen the past and it worked: it was not just that 
there was no need to change, change was unthinkable,190 
Changes in China, especially ideas from the West were slow to be accepted, in part this was 
due to the imperial governments’ dislike of foreigners from the West, as well as anything 
from the West. Westerners were seen as aggressors trying to reap the rich resources of 
China.191  
 
Even though there some legal codes over commercial matters like contracts and property, 
they were basic and relatively insignificant over other matters like crimes, social order and 
treason.192 However, what the Chinese imperial governments did not provide, the merchant 
and trade associations (tongxiang or huiguan) did.193 Tongxiang were regional associations, 
which literally means “same hometown” also known as “local-system loyalties”. They were 
networks or guild organisations comprising of members originating from a region in China.194 
Another type of clannishness merchant associations were known as huiguan, literally means 
“native-place associations”, comprising of occupational group or trade specific to an area.195 
Commerce was in effective self-regulated by tongxiang or huiguan,196 sophisticated rules of 
conduct were made mainly by senior members (elders) to establish order and instil 
trustworthiness in the market place.197 These rules had been a mixed bag of influences ranging 
from Confucian doctrines, familism, to trade specific or regional customs.198 The contents of 
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these rules also favoured the maintenance of strong networks.199 Senior members of these 
tongxiang or huiguan would often mediate disputes between members on an informally basis 
to mend relationships.200 On occasions if disputes were brought before a court, the magistrate 
could consult the rules of tongxiang or huiguan to make a ruling.201 These tongxiang or 
huiguan were collectives liken professional or representative bodies, with membership 
consist mainly of family owned and managed enterprises.202  
 
Besides family enterprises, there were also kinship enterprises (ancestral trusts)203 or Chinese 
lineage corporations, which consisted of extended family members or descents of several 
generations.204 Unlike Western legal doctrine where a corporation is a separate entity, these 
kinship enterprises were treated as an clan or ancestral commune.205 They operated like large 
family enterprises, the governance grounded upon Confucian doctrines of hierarchical 
order,206 this meant the eldest male of the eldest line occupied the highest position, but 
operational matters were left to a committee of senior members of the clan.207 This meant the 
head or the board’s decisions should not be questioned under filial norms. Moreover, 
Confucian moral principles were applicable to review the decisions and actions of the 
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board.208 Even the magistrate during Ming and Qing dynasty had to be knowledgeable about 
Confucian doctrines and familial governance to execute his duties as a judge and government 
official.209 
 
The concept of family and kinship enterprises persisted for centuries in China, and was even 
transplanted by Chinese migrants into Southeast Asia.210 The seeds of modern Chinese 
companies (kongsi) were sown, according to Wang around the period of the Ming Dynasty.211 
The literal translation of kongsi is - public department or administration of public affairs.212 
Kongsi were not creatures of legal instruments, it emerged out of an informal commercial 
arrangements used by Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia in the 18th Century used initially to 
operate mining business.213 They were self-regulated entities drawing on a spirit of 
cooperation and consideration of mutual welfare for migrant workers, 214 who usually had a 
stake in these companies.215 However, these kongsi were organised and operated more like 
huiguan in China.216 Overtime these kongsi began to change and the heads known as towkay 
(means “boss” in Hokkien - Chinese dialect) who took over the business operations and 
turned them into family enterprises.217 Nevertheless, the cooperative spirit between towkays 
survived in the form of business networks.218 These networks built on personal relations 
between the heads of each business enterprise. Instead of formal contracts, these 
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entrepreneurs would do “deals” based on their word or a handshake and the operative word 
for this spirit based on mutual trust was known as xingyong.219 The notion of xingyong drew 
from Confucian doctrine about trust and relationships (see discussions five virtues above and 
business networks below).220  
 
Even if, an argument about Confucian capitalism or strict adherence to Confucian principles 
not practicable in the modern business context,221 the degree of paternalistic control and 
Confucian influence had slipped with the new generations of corporate leaders educated in 
the West,222 this system of governance in Chinese family companies in Hong Kong, 
withstanding the test of time.223 
 
Hong Kong’s Brand of Entrepreneurial Familism, Network Economy, and Paternalist 
Governance 
Hong Kong is one of the freest economies in the world.224 The island once called “a barren 
rock” because apart from its labour force, the island has little to no natural resources.225 Since 
the island’s colonisation by the British over a century ago, Hong Kong had established its 
position as China’s main entrepot, but by the 1950s, trade with China began to fall as the 
Chinese communist party took over power in China.226 There was shift in the economy Hong 
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Kong’s from entreport trade to light industries like textiles and plastics.227 By the 1960s, the 
economy took off with rapid growth in light industrial productions and export trade.228 In the 
1970s, Hong Kong’s economic growth continued to climb rapidly, consequently property 
prices boomed.229 Also during this period, the growth of the manufacturing sector plateau. 
The focus was to capitalise on a networks of banks, shipping and insurance agencies.230 
Along with the growth of the number of finance companies and the establishment of several 
stock exchanges, by the late 1970s, Hong Kong began to transform itself to become a 
regional financial centre.231 For the most part of local Chinese entrepreneurs were behind this 
transformation. Whilst large British and multinational companies flocked into the island city 
to trade with China, it was the local Chinese entrepreneurs were the engine behind the 
island’s economic development as they grew exponentially in numbers within a relatively 
short time.232 Compared to the other Asian countries the Colonial government played a 
relatively small role in Hong Kong’s economic miracle.233 The government tended to focus 
on basic infrastructure, education, and public housing.234  
 
Without much natural resource, the local Chinese entrepreneurs in Hong Kong took 
advantage of the low labour cost, low taxes, and relatively few legal barriers in Hong Kong to 
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start up their companies.235 Yu noted that Hong Kong had a long history of profit seeking 
mentality amongst the local residents,236 in part, this was due to the widely held perception 
that the island was a trading British outpost, and there was little sense of belonging, so it was 
a place to make money and then migrate to other countries.237 Furthermore, sociological and 
political factors were favourable to the supply of entrepreneurship in its economic 
development.238  
 
Chinese family values played an instrumental role in entrepreneurialism in Hong Kong.239 
Chen noted that, ‘for the Chinese, business has always been connected to family. In fact, in 
traditional Chinese culture, the family serves as the basis for and prototypical unit of all 
organizations…’240 More important, ‘the contribution of business families to the economy of 
Greater China is staggering. According to the estimation of one of the top ten Hong Kong 
fund managers, around 40 percent of Hong Kong’s stock market capitalization in 1999 was 
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controlled by fifteen family groups.’241 This form of entrepreneurialism is branded as 
entrepreneurial familism (or family-centre entrepreneurialism).242 
 
Hong Kong’s brand of entrepreneurial familism, according to Yu exhibited three major 
characteristics;   
Firstly, a feature which enhances the power of the father figure is the common ownership of 
family belongings. Company assets are normally seen as belonging to the family group, although 
individuals may have stewardship of certain parts of the resources… [C]hinese family enterprises use 
filial piety, honour, ‘rengqing’ (moral obligation), pressure to live up to family expectations and 
family training to ensure its members conform with the goals of the family business. Secondly, a 
Chinese family firm in Hong Kong is governed by paternalism… [O]wners of the family firms 
considered themselves as patriarchal business leaders who conferred welfare benefits on their 
employees as favours… [T]hirdly, a Chinese family firm in Hong Kong engages extensively in 
business networks and nepotism which are, in fact, an extension of family culture… [I]n Chinese 
practice, trust works on the basis of personal obligations, the maintenance of reputation (family name) 
and face. Nepotism, which is both reinforcement and a result of the family firm structure that prevails, 
is a means of counteracting the problem of trust [emphasis added].243 
 
A key unique characteristic of Hong Kong’s entrepreneurial familism according to Redding 
has to do its cultural beliefs and moral values.244 He labelled this unique blend of value 
driven capitalism as “the Spirit of Chinese Capitalism”.245 It stems from the cultural values 
and practices in family companies that shape the way the head of these companies think and 
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behave.246 Furthermore, he argued that it was the combination of Confucian teachings, 
entrepreneurial familism, and business network structures were the driving force behind 
Hong Kong’s economic growth.247  
 
The importance of Hong Kong’s business networks should not be underestimated. It is 
perhaps one of the key factors in the success of Chinese family companies in Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, China and overseas Chinese businesses in South East Asia,248 also known as network 
the “bamboo network”.249 For Hong Kong, interlocking and loosely connected companies 
had been a permanent feature on the island’s business landscape for many years.250 
Historically, these networks centred on elite Chinese families or large British trading houses 
known as ‘the hongs’.251 The influences of these ‘hongs’ (in particular, Chinese Hongs)252 in 
the island’s economy and government policies continued to be considerable even into the 
present.253  
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Hong Kong has a small number of very large conglomerate groups dominating key sectors of 
the economy like real estate, telecommunications, food, energy, automotive, commodity, 
transport, and retailing subsidiaries.254 Williams argued that,  
The common corporate structure consists of interconnected subsidiaries and extensive cross-ownership. 
Most Hong Kong listed companies are controlled by family interests with interlocking share-
holding structures that make corporate raids all but impossible and allow substantial minority 
family shareholders to retain effective control of most public companies. The nature of these 
interlinking corporations is a characteristic feature of the domestic economy and it is precisely 
those who control such companies that have both a vested interest in repelling competition as well 
as political power, exercised directly or indirectly, to persuade government that competition regulation 
should not be introduced into the Hong Kong domestic market. This concentration of interlinked 
economic power in the hands of a few oligarchic families has not gone unremarked [emphasis 
added].255   
 
 
The foundation of Hong Kong’s business networks is based on a system of trust between 
Chinese family companies at a personal level.256 Personal trust is very important, it could 
facilitate quicker decisions because no formal process or due diligence is required. Often the 
“word” of the head of a company is enough to strike a business deal. Even though this system 
of trust is not a substitute for legal agreement, long-term orientated business partnerships.257 
Moreover, trust has moral dimensions. Hamilton noted that,  
The moral content of behavior in such a network-based society [Asia] is relation-specific and 
situationally defined. There is no assumption, as there is in the West, of abstract standards, such as 
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justice and honesty, equally applying to all participants regardless of their situation. Embedded in a 
world of differentially categorized social relationships, Asian define what is inappropriate moral 
behavior by reading the situation and by knowing the social categories of, and sets of 
relationships between, the actors involved [emphasis added].258 
This Asian network based system stems from the Confucian notion of reciprocity and 
propriety (see above section).259  
 
One of his most valuable contributions to the field of international management was how 
strong Confucius teachings are rooted in Asia, in particular Hong Kong, where it was ranked 
1st place for Confucian dynamism.260 Moreover, Hofstede and Bond found, ‘It then appeared 
that the country scores on Confucian Dynamism derived from this exercise are strongly 
associated with those countries’ economic growth. Thus we found a cultural link to an 
economic phenomenon.’261 This reinforces the argument that entrepreneurial familism is 
behind Hong Kong’s economic growth.  
 
Given Hong Kong’s high “power distance”, “masculine” values, “collectivist” values,  and 
“Confucian dynamism”, governance is hierarchical and personality centred. This is because 
these values reinforced the need for companies to be governed from a strong top-down 
culturally appropriate system. This means the head often rules over the affairs of the 
company with almost absolute discretion.262 This is distinct from the structured, process-
                                                     
258 Gary Hamilton, ‘The Theoretical Significance of Asian Business Networks’ in Gary Hamilton (ed) Asian 
Business Networks (Walter de Gruyter, 1996) 283, 289. 
259 Wong Siu-lun, ‘Chinese Entrepreneurs and Business Trust’ in Gary Hamilton (ed) Asian Business Networks 
(Walter de Gruyter, 1996) 13, 24. For detailed discussions about Confucian doctrines, see Chapter 5. 
260 Geert Hofstede and Michael Bond, ‘The Confucius Connection: From Cultural Roots to Economic Growth’ 
(1988) 16 Organizational Dynamics, 5, 12-13. 
261 Geert Hofstede and Michael Bond, ‘The Confucius Connection: From Cultural Roots to Economic Growth’ 
(1988) 16 Organizational Dynamics, 5, 17. 
262 Gordon Redding, ‘The Conditional Relevance of Corporate Governance Advice in the Context of Asian 
Business Systems’ (2004) 10 Asia-Pacific Business Review, 272, 285. 
47 
 
oriented, and ruled based governance in the West.263 From the interviews a number of 
Chair/CEO of Chinese family companies in Hong Kong,264 Redding found these companies 
are governed under a hierarchical structure with power concentrated in the hands of the head 
by the family patriarch or matriarch. 265 This brand of governance is characterised as 
“paternalistic”.266  
 
Paternalism is more than just a type of leadership behaviour.267 It is an entrenched cultural 
characteristic of Chinese family companies and the wider society.268 This parental like 
relationship at the organisational level exist between the head and everyone in the 
company,269 Erben and Ayse Guneser noted that, 
When paternalism is analyzed from the perspective of interpersonal relations, we can talk about 
superior and subordinate relationships. This type of leadership is fairly similar to autocratic 
leadership, except that in paternalism, the leader is like a father and takes care of the followers 
like a parent would. In the paternalistic exchange between the leader and the followers, the leader 
provides a holistic concern for the followers and their families in exchange for unquestioned obedience 
and loyalty on the part of the followers. In the paternalistic relationship, employees may be punished 
by the leader if they act independently [emphasis added].270 
Furthermore, paternalistic leaders are often looked upon positively in Chinese societies like 
in Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan because of their fatherly concern for the followers and 
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their attempt to create a family-like atmosphere in the company.271 The negative side of 
paternalistic leadership is the possibility of the relations in the company turn into nepotism 
and resources are only given to a loyal group of followers.272 
 
Paternalistic governance (as discussed earlier sections of this article) takes root from 
Confucian order in the family.273 The head of the company are expected to be parent like 
benevolent leaders.274 Cheung and Chan observed,  
Hence while leaders take care of their subordinates’ welfare, their subordinates should obey and behave 
loyally to their leaders. As such, subordinates should not form cliques or faction within the 
organization. Hierarchical order is clear-cut and people have their own clear roles, like parents 
and children. Because leaders act like parents, they should be forgiving and magnanimous and 
abstain from coercing their subordinates. Rather they should educate their subordinates 
patiently in order to enhance their virtues [emphasis added].275 
This parental like approach to leadership has a built in sense of the legitimacy of the superior-
subordinate relationship, for the Chinese, it is an extension of a Confucian natural order of 
things.276 Furthermore, if children are on the board of directors and the patriarch or a 
matriarch is the head. According to the Confucian notion of “filial piety” (xiao - see details in 
the above section), the children shall serve in complete obedience to their parents and not the 
company.277  
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There are some advantages in paternalistic governance. Since power is vested with the one 
person, the decisions can be made relatively quickly.278 Internal organisational efficiency 
could also be achieved through vertical control.279 There are also cost savings in small family 
companies, as family members are usually not paid. They work in the family company out of 
a sense of loyalty and personal obligations.280 In addition, loans are usually from family 
members and relatives, at little to no interest charged.281 Finally, there is an expectation of 
benevolent leadership, which stems from Confucian ethics, where harmonious relationships 
are important and thus the emphasis on cooperation and avoidance of conflict is embedded 
into the organisational culture of the family company.282 Wah noted that,  
[Confucian] Leadership is built on a foundation of moral character and exercised through 
virtuous examples…[H]e prefers to “rule by virtue” rather than “rule by laws”…[I]n today’s 
rapid dynamic business environment, organizations have to struggle between the battle for survival and 
the battle for excellence. While it is important to change and adopt new management techniques in 
order to survive or excel, it is still important for the Chinese leader to preserve some of these 
Confucian values and ethics like loyalty and morality, courage and righteousness, faithfulness 
and honesty, benevolence and compassion, conscientiousness and altruism as well as 
considerateness and courtesy, just to name a few. To Confucius, these are the moral principles that 
underlie all human actions [emphasis added].283 
 
There are also many disadvantages. Since paternalistic leadership is authoritarian, the 
decisions made by the head of the company are not to be questioned. This means the rationale 
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of decisions is not always justifiable in an analytical manner.284 Instead, personal principles 
and experiences form the basis of many decisions.285 This leadership style also tends to 
repress professional talents,286 so the growth is limited due to the lack of new blood and 
ideas.287 Non-family employees are often left out of promotional opportunities, and have a 
low degree of loyal and responsibility towards the company.288 Another barrier Chinese 
family companies confront is limited access to finances, because they tend to use personal 
saving or loans from family members and extended relatives to fund their enterprise. In part, 
this is due to their reluctance to let outsiders examine their company’s accounts. 289 Hence, 
the drawbacks limits the long-term growth potential and many of these companies remain 
undercapitalise. The lack of institutionalised successions plan also undermines the longevity 
of family companies.290 In spite of the disadvantages, the advantages from a flexible, 
relational, paternalistic structure and non-legal approach outweigh any drawback. This 
approach to corporate governance in Chinese society withstood the test of time. 
 
Conclusions  
This paper started from a journey about 3,000 thousand ago, focusing on concepts and 
principles of one of China most eminent philosophers - Confucius. This work’s primary 
objective is to endeavour to explain why Confucius’s ideas and ideals is so versatile, 
withstanding the test of time, and its relevance in contemporary Chinese societies. 
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Confucius had a disdain for laws and codes, as he believed that a nation led by laws was 
condemned because perpetrators could find ways to avoid punishments. The central thesis of 
his teachings is for individuals to embrace moral principles to internalise a sense of 
righteousness (yi) and attaining virtue (de), as well as achieve social harmony through the 
practice of propriety (li). This reflected his belief that human nature is good, thus the role of li 
as a regulatory principle was to steer people towards a moral life.  
 
Confucius had always maintained that he did not create with the concepts of “ways of 
heaven” (tienli) and li. He merely revived it. Confucius had reiterated that li originated from 
ancient sages to teach human beings about natural order of things. Li as a concept and 
doctrine was akin to Western medieval natural law. However, it is different in the sense that 
there is no biblical reference to li, except to say it is the ways of heaven. What li espouse as a 
regulatory principle is non-legal, socially endorsed rule of conduct or social norm based on 
moral principles and social stratification with the ultimate goal of achieving a harmonious 
order.  
 
For Confucius that harmonious order is achieved through sangang wu chang. Sangang is the 
bedrock of Chinese social order and stability for over three thousand years. It focuses on the 
three key bonds in human relationships, out of which the two bonds between ruler and 
subject, father and son are the most important. The obligation between subject and ruler is 
one of loyalty (zhong) and between son and father is filial piety (xiao). Even though on the 
surface, these obligations seemed draconian and top down, both the ruler and father have 
obligations too, they are expected to be exercise paternalistic care and love in their decisions 
and actions. Conceptually, loyalty is closely linked to filial piety. Both loyalty and filial piety 
shared a common thread; the relationships are vertical and inflexible (subjects have to be 
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loyal to their ruler, son has be filial towards his father), and moral values unpinning the 
hierarchical order.291 More important, for those who practice wu chang de, they are 
instinctively xiao (filial piety) child, and zhong (loyal) subjects because only those who 
practice wu change de would voluntarily be xiao, as this is an expression of a child’s 
gratitude towards his / her parent for the years of love and care. A person who is xiao would 
not defy his superior or seniors and thus would be loyal to the ruler. Furthermore, Confucius 
believed that xiao is the paramount virtue governing human relations and representation of 
virtuous excellence.292 Wu chang is learnt through self-cultivation. It requires the use self-
reflection and introspection to regulate and govern one’s thoughts and behaviour.  In 
effective, complying with objectives in wu chang de is a self-policing exercise.  
 
The principles extracted from sangang wu chang demonstrate that Confucian governance is 
not rule based, it is instead, relational centred and paternalistic in nature. Relational because 
Confucian teachings focus on humaneness and reciprocity where consensus between parties 
based on moral ideals is central, paternalistic as it maintains order via a chain of command 
underscored by assumptions of paternal care for the welfare of others, altogether forms the 
vision of a harmonious social order. 
 
History has shown that China never had an indigenous company law, or ever felt the need to 
enact until pressure from the West compelled the last Chinese imperial government of the 
Qing dynasty, just a few years before its demise to transplant European company laws into 
China. Despite the new laws, majority of the Chinese business enterprises continued its old 
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ways. What the imperial governments did not provide, in terms of business laws and 
regulations, the merchant and trade associations (tongxiang and huiguan) did. Much of the 
contents of these self-governing rules were based on Confucian principles and control was 
paternalistic in nature. 
 
Even though time and modern developments had eroded the moral justifications and 
references to tienli had eroded, relational business linkages in the form of networks and 
paternalistic governance are alive and well in Chinese societies like Hong Kong. This is a 
starling contrast to Western notions of good corporate governance rests on accountability and 
transparency. Hong Kong’s success in rapid economic growth was due to family-centre 
entrepreneurialism. Whilst law also played a role in Hong Kong’s economic development 
Confucian doctrines influence on its governance allowed these family companies to survive a 
global competitive environment. 
    
Even though Confucius lived about three thousands of years ago, his regulatory ideas of 
moral principles and relationship centred approach had been modified and adapted in modern 
regulatory techniques for the regulation of businesses, in particular the use of restorative 
justice in enforcing legal obligations found in Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) in Australia.293 
A proponent of restorative justice asserted that this framework aims to restore damaged 
relationships, communities, and invoke a sense of compassion.294 It is assumed this would not 
only deliver a just order, but a caring society.295 One of the undercurrent ideas of restorative 
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justice is to promote cooperative spirit and the use of persuasion to resolve problems.296 The 
one fundamental and turnkey element for restorative justice to work is the belief that 
regulatees are virtuous actors.297 Interestingly similar to Confucius emphasis on fostering 
moral values, restorative justice promotes rehabilitation of wrongdoers by applying re-
integrative shaming with the endorsement of communities and reinforced from young in the 
family life.298 This idea came out of research from the fascination with Japan’s low crime 
rates. They found that the Japanese social norms and value system was profoundly influenced 
by Confucianism.299  
 
With regards to corporate governance, the experiences from the fall of Enron, Worldcom and 
the recent Global Financial Crisis demonstrated that legal rules are vulnerable to human 
vices. No matter how strict or the growth in the number of legal rules, regulatory mechanisms 
and enforcement institutions, and the number of processes and structural requirements place 
on corporate governance, there is no substitute to the commitment of “doing the right thing”. 
This is a normative criterion that only voluntary compliance could make it work. Laws could 
only compile superficial or creative compliance. So acting morally promotes good corporate 
governance. What the Confucian principles of governance had shown it does not require legal 
rules and sanctions – self regulation, self policing and self cultivation of the moral ideals in 
sangang wu chang lays the ground rules for good governance. Then again, there are some 
concepts like xiao, which is central to Confucian doctrines in Chinese society, for Westerners 
this cultural value divided might be too hard to bridge. Nevertheless, moral based governance 
principles could be universally acceptable supplement to regulate corporate governance. It 
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could be the fundamentals of how future legal rules about corporate governance could be 
built on. 
